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Sokol: Portrait of a Rabbinic Dissident

PORTRAIT OF A RABBINIC DISSIDENT: AKAVYA BEN
MEHALALEL CONFRONTS THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT
Moshe Sokol *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Akavya ben Mehalalel is the first-century protagonist in the
narrative, which is the subject of this study. Akavya ben Mehalalel
dissented from the majority on a matter of Jewish law and painfully
What was his
suffered the consequences of that dissent. 1
jurisprudence? What motivated him? What exactly was his fate? Did
he change his views throughout his lifetime? What deathbed advice
did he offer his son? These questions are taken up in a passage from
the fifth chapter of Mishna Eduyot, a compilation of teachings on a
variety of subjects composed in Yavneh, shortly after the destruction
of the Second Temple.
As it happens, we possess very few teachings of Akavya,
primarily those included in this mishna. The second teaching of a nonlegal nature is recorded in another mishna, in Pirkei Avot:
Akavya ben Mehalalel said: Reflect on three things and
you will avoid transgression: Know where you came
from, where you are going, and before whom you will
have to give and account and reckoning. Where you
came from? From a putrid drop. Where you are going?
To a place of dust, worms, and maggots. And before
whom you will have to give an account and reckoning?

Moshe Sokol is Professor of Philosophy and Jewish Studies, and Dean of the
Lander College for Men of the Touro College and University System.
1 See C. Licht, Tradition and Innovation: Topics in Rabbinic Literature, GIVAT
HAVIVA, 47-52 (1989) (Hebrew) (summarizing the scholarly positions on exactly
when Akavya lived and for a general discussion of this text).
*
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Before the Supreme King of Kings, the Holy One,
Blessed be He. 2
This crucial message appears to have served as the guidepost
for Akavya’s own tragic life, as we shall see. The text which we shall
analyze appears below:
6. Akavya ben Mahalalel testified concerning four
things. They said to him: Akavya, retract these four
things which you say, and we will make you the head
of the court in Israel. He said to them: it is better for me
to be called a fool all my days than that I should become
[even] for one hour a wicked man before God; So they
shouldn’t say: “he withdrew his opinions for the sake
of power.” He used to pronounce impure the hair which
has been left over [in leprosy], And green (yellow)
blood (of vaginal discharge); But the Sages declared
them clean. He used to permit the wool of a first-born
animal which was blemished and which had fallen out
and had been put in a niche, the first-born being
slaughtered afterwards; But the sages forbid it. He used
to say: a woman proselyte and a freed slave-woman are
not made to drink of the bitter waters. But the Sages
say: they are made to drink. They said to him: it
happened in the case of Karkemith, a freed slavewoman who was in Jerusalem, that Shemaiah and
Avtalion made her drink. He said to them: they made
her drink an example (and not the real water).
Whereupon they excommunicated him; and he died
while he was under excommunication, and the court
stoned his coffin. Rabbi Judah said: God forbid [that
one should say] that Akavya was excommunicated; for
the courtyard is never locked for any man in Israel who
was equal to Avavia ben Mahalalel in wisdom and the
fear of sin. But whom did they excommunicate? Eliezer
the son of Hanoch who cast doubt against the laws
concerning the purifying of the hands. And when he
died the court sent and laid a stone on his coffin. This

2

Pirkei Avot 3:1.
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teaches that whoever is excommunicated and dies while
under excommunication, his coffin is stoned
7. At the time of his death he said to his son, “Retract
the four opinions which I used to declare.” He (the said
to him, “Why did not you retract them?” He said to him,
“I heard them from the mouth of the many, and they
heard [the contrary] from the mouth of the many. I
stood fast by the tradition which I heard, and they stood
fast by the tradition which they heard. But you have
heard [my tradition] from the mouth of a single
individual and [their tradition] from the mouth of the
many. It is better to leave the opinion of the single
individual and to hold by the opinion of the many.” He
said to him, “Father commend me to your colleagues.”
He said to him, “I will not commend you.” He said to
him, “Have you found in me any wrong?” He said, “No;
your own deeds will cause you to be near, and your own
actions will distance you. 3
Our narrative starts by reporting that Akavya attested to four
laws. The rabbis responded with an offer: If you retract these four
testimonies, we will appoint you av bet din, head of the supreme
rabbinical court, a position second only to the nasi, the leader of the
Jewish community and court. It would appear that the rabbis, in effect,
wished to bribe him into abandoning his position by promises of great
rabbinic prominence. Surely that is unexpected, to say the very least.
Akavya’s response to their offer is tart indeed. He asserts that
he would rather be called a fool his entire life, for rejecting the gain of
high office, than be evil before God just for a moment. He then adds
that he does not want people to say of him that because of personal
gain, he retracted his position. For our purposes here, let us focus on
the first point, that Jewish legal truth and personal conscience may
never be sacrificed. Even if people think of him as a fool for
abandoning great personal gain, those considerations are irrelevant.
As Akavya taught in Pirkei Avot, nothing matters, but God’s righteous
judgment. The values of social status, wealth, and prestige, which the
rabbis offer, are no more than byproducts of the physical dimension to
Mishnah Eduyot 6, SEFARIA, Mishnah Eduyout 5:6-7,
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Eduyot.5.7?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en (last
visited Apr. 6, 2020).
3
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the human condition, which ends in burial and decay, for which reason
they are not values at all. The only enduring dimension of the human
being, the only dimension which possesses absolute value, is that
which adheres to God and to the truths of His Torah. He and the rabbis
speak different languages and profess incommensurate values. What
they value and seek to bribe him with is simply of no value at all to
Akavya himself. Thus, Akavya’s teaching in Pirkei Avot illuminates
his response to the rabbis’ offer.
That said, how are we to understand the offer of the rabbis?
How could they even attempt to bribe a person by offering him high
office, especially a man with such deep and uncompromising
principles? While we cannot say for sure, as the text does not explain
itself, I would conjecture that the rabbis meant to say this:
You, Akavya, take an isolated position against the
majority view. We understand and respect your
convictions. However, true human greatness does not
lie in isolation. It has been said that humans are by their
very nature political animals, that we live and function
only within society. You must recognize the essential
social context of the human condition. You are a great
scholar, and the social context within which you live is
the community of scholars. If you accept that reality
and choose to conform to its standards, then because of
your knowledge, deep principles, and gifts, we will
make you its leader.
On this account, the offer was not so much a bribe, as it was a
means to foster within him the social consciousness which would make
his ascension to high office deserved.
The mishna next proceeds to identify the four points of law in
which Akavya opposed the majority. Only one is germane to our
analysis. During Temple times, a woman accused of an adulterous
relationship by her husband, under certain well-defined halakhic
circumstances, becomes a sotah, and according to biblical law, must
drink “mei sotah,” special waters which are probative of her guilt or
innocence. The question at hand is whether or not these laws apply to
a female convert 4 as well, or only to a woman born Jewish. Akavya
took the view that they do not apply, while the Sages maintained that
4

Or a female gentile slave who when freed becomes Jewish.
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they did. In support of their position, the Sages recount a tradition
according to which during Temple times Shemaya and Avtalyon, the
two heads of the Sanhedrin then, required a female convert by the name
of Karkamis to drink mei sotah. This demonstrates that the Sages were
correct. Akavya responded, somewhat enigmatically, that “they made
her drink by example.” His response, asserts the mishna, led the Sages
to excommunicate him, and according to this tradition, he died
excommunicated whereupon the court stoned his coffin.
Before we examine the meaning of Akavya’s response and the
very harsh response it evoked, it is first important to observe that the
debate at hand could not be resolved on the basis of halakhic argument,
which is how halakhic differences are typically adjudicated. This is
because the debate between Akavya and the Sages was a debate about
which oral tradition was correct. As will be evident later, Akavya
maintained that he possessed an impeccably reliable tradition. Mainly,
that the majority position amongst the ancient Sages was that a convert
could not drink mei sotah, while the Sages maintained with equal
certainty that they had an impeccably reliable tradition that a convert
would drink mei sotah. The debate was only over whose testimony
about the tradition was correct. In other words, the debate was about
a matter of fact—the principle empirically verifiable reliability of oral
transmission—rather than a matter of value—what the halakha by
virtue of its own inner logic should require. Therefore, the proof the
Sages offer is an empirical one, attesting to the reliability of their
tradition by appeal to the historical practice of two great authorities,
rather than a halakhic one per se. It is worth noting that this provides
an explanation for why Akavya, who lived during Temple times, was
not accused of being a rebellious elder, a member of the Sanhedrin who
refuses to submit to the majority, a cardinal crime punishable by death.
According to one account in the Talmud, the law of rebellious elder
applies only when the majority grounds its position in an oral tradition,
while the dissident scholar grounds his position in autonomous human
reasoning. This Akavya did not do, since both he and the Sages based
their positions on oral traditions. 5
Interestingly, Akavya does not cast doubt upon the reliability
of the Sages’ tradition regarding the practice of Shmaya and Avtalion.
See TB Sanhedrin 88a. The Talmud there offers a second explanation, that
Akavya never issued a formal halakhic decision on the basis of his tradition, so
there was no schism in practice.
5
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He concedes the facts, yet casts doubt on the utility of that precedent
for adjudicating the law.
How does he do so? By asserting that Shemaya and Avtalyon
“made her drink by example.” What is the meaning of this somewhat
obscure phrase? The classical commentators offer two fairly similar
interpretations. 6 The one I shall focus on here turns on the personal
status of Shemaya and Avtalyon themselves, for according to various
rabbinic sources, they were converts. 7 As such, Akavya argued, they
had a vested interest in regularizing the status of converts, for which
reason they treated Karkamis the female convert like any other Jewish
woman, and they required that she drink mei sotah. In effect, Akavya
was arguing that Shemaya’s and Avtalyon’s position was tainted by
personal interest, and their practice could not serve as a legal
precedent. 8
According to this interpretation, it is not difficult to see why
the Sages excommunicated Akavya. First, his curt and acerbic
comment cast aspersions on the integrity of the greatest scholars of
their generation, heads of the Sanhedrin, and pivotal vehicles for the
transmission of the Oral Law to future generations. 9 He suspected
them of distorting halakhic truth to serve their own personal interests.
Second, such claims undermine the whole of the halakhic system, for
if the motives of even the greatest scholars can be suspect, then the
halakhic decisions of all scholars may be suspect as well. To draw
upon a contemporary example, this would be like arguing that a
Hispanic US judge must recuse himself from sitting on a case in which
the defendant is Hispanic as well. If this is what Akavya meant, it
would be a shocking accusation, outside the pale of standard halakhic
discourse. Indeed, it seems fair to ask how he could even make that
claim.
By way of sharpening this question, consider the position of R.
Yehuda, cited next in the mishna. R. Yehuda could simply not accept
that a man of Akavya’s stature was excommunicated. “God forbid,”
he proclaimed, “that Akavya was excommunicated! For the Temple
courtyard is never locked for any man of Israel who has the wisdom
and fear of sin like Akavya ben Mehalalel.” The reference here is to
Passover Eve, when the Temple courtyard was jam-packed with
6
7
8
9

See Ra’avad, Rambam and R. Ovadia M’Bartenura (Ra’av) ad. loc.
See TB Gittin 57b and TB Sanhedrin 96b, among other sources.
On this interpretation, they themselves are the example in question.
See Pirkei Avot 1:1.
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worshippers sacrificing their Passover lambs. Despite the massive
crowds, no one exceeded Akavya in wisdom and fear of God. R.
Yehuda maintained that it was simply unthinkable that Akavya might
have been excommunicated, and the oral tradition must have confused
Akavya with another scholar.
Akavya, in his view, was
unimpeachable.
Now, this perspective sharpens one question while answering
another. It sharpens the question of how Akavya could have made the
comments he did, given his extraordinary stature. However, it helps
answer another. Why were the Sages so disturbed about Akavya’s
dissent that they felt compelled to offer him the post of av beth din
(head of the court) if he retracted his positions? The answer may well
be that precisely because of Akavya’s stature, his dissent was all the
more dangerous. If an average scholar were to dissent, it would not
threaten the viability of the system for halakhic (Jewish legal)
adjudication. However, dissent by a man of Akavya’s stature could
lead to a schism in the community, whose consequences might be its
irreparable splintering. The Sages sought to avoid this at all costs.
But given Akavya’s stature, why then did he cast aspersions on
the great Shemaya and Avtalyon? Part of the answer, I would suggest,
lies exactly in the praise R. Yehuda offered: Akavya feared sin. His
teaching recorded in Pirkei Avot stressed the same theme: All that
matters in life is how one stands before God in judgment. Akavya
lived every moment in the presence of God and in fear of His
judgment. He could tolerate not a whiff of deviation from that exacting
standard, not in himself, and not in anyone else, no matter their stature.
Consequent upon this sensibility was no doubt the accurate view that
not everyone could live up to these standards, and this may have bred
a certain skepticism. People are not what they may seem to be, for do
even people of stature live by the eternally present fear of sin? How
many people can? Yet many people nevertheless achieve high office.
Do they really deserve high office? Hardly, by the elevated standards
of Akavya. In that respect, all are failures, the question being only to
what extent.
This sensibility may have led Akavya to suspect the worst, not
because Shemaya and Avtalyon were especially flawed. They were
not; indeed they were great men. But they were men nonetheless, who
could never live up to the uncompromising standards of Akavya.
Akavya would have suspected the motives of anyone, irrespective of
stature, for all motives on the part of people who do not live in exacting
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fear of God’s judgment are mixed. Whose choices reflect no element,
even slight, of self-interest? Only those who live in the unremitting
presence of God. Those who do not are likely to suffer from a mixture
of motives, some altruistic, some self-serving, which undermines their
intellectual integrity. Shemaya and Avtalyon may well have been men
of great stature, but they could not meet Akavya’s relentlessly high
standards, and so for him, their motives must have been mixed.
However, we might still ask why a suspicion alone would
render their decision invalid. Surely Shmaya’s and Avtalyon’s
reputations were outstanding, and that should have been enough,
suspicions notwithstanding. I would suggest, therefore, that a second
factor was at play as well. Akavya possessed an unshakeable
commitment to the truth as he saw it. Any halakhic decision, which
may have been motivated even only slightly by factors unrelated to
halakhic truth, rendered the decision unreliable, and therefore,
halakhically illegitimate. Thus, there were two factors at play, first,
Akavya’s exacting standards for personal intellectual integrity, and
second, his exacting standards for the processes of halakhic decisionmaking. Taken together, they led Akavya to reject as legal precedent
Shamaya’s and Avtalyon’s practice with regard to Karkamis the
convert.
We now have an even clearer explanation for why the Sages
feared Akavya’s dissent. Akavya was such a religious giant that his
dissent really could lead to a schism. Unfortunately, Jewish history
has borne out such fears. Charismatic figures over the millennia have
fractured the Jewish people, from ancient through medieval into
modern times. On this reading, the Sages were right to fear Akavya’s
dissent.
II.

PART TWO: AKAVYA’S DEATHBED ADVICE TO HIS
SON

Time passes, although we don’t know how long, and we next
meet up with Akavya on his deathbed, in a final conversation with his
son. Interestingly, his son remains anonymous. We do not know his
name or anything about him, but for this dialogue: He remains lost to
the rabbinic tradition, much like the teachings of his father.
In reading this passage, we must ask ourselves whether or not
Akavya has changed in any way over the years, and whether or not he
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has softened his views. What advice can a great, if ostracized,
dissident offer his son as he leaves the world?
“My son”,” Akavya says, “retract the four teachings I used to
say.” Now upon reflection, this is astonishing indeed. Akavya
sacrificed his whole social life and religious stature because he was
convinced that his oral tradition was correct. If one follows the first
view recorded in the Mishnah, not R. Yehuda’s, Akavya spent the
remainder of his life excommunicated, after having rejected an offer
for one of the highest positions in the land, all because of his
uncompromising commitment to the truth. How then could he advise
his son to abandon those very halakhic positions for which he had
sacrificed so much?
His own son asks him a similar question: “If you want me to
abandon those positions, why then didn’t you?” There is only one
halakhic truth: Either you were right, or you were wrong. If you were
right, then I cannot abandon your position, and if you were wrong, then
why didn’t you abandon your position yourself?
Akavya’s response is a fascinating one and turns on a
distinction between legal formalism and legal truth. 10 While there may
(or may not) be an objective legal truth regarding the status of these
disputed cases, legal practice is always determined by following the
formal processes for adjudicating disputes. One of the cardinal
principles for such adjudication is adherence to the majority. Thus,
Akavya meant to say to his son: I am in possession of an impeccably
reliable tradition, which I myself heard from a majority of scholars,
that the majority took the position I did. Although my colleagues
maintain that they are in possession of an equally reliable tradition that
the majority sided with their position, I cannot abandon my oral
tradition for theirs, because I myself heard it from a majority. Thus,
the formal processes for the adjudication of halakha do not permit me
to abandon my position.
“However,” Akavya continued: [Y]our position is quite
different. You heard my oral tradition from me, and you heard the
Sages’ oral tradition from them. I am a lone advocate of my tradition,
while they are not. Therefore, the formal procedure of majority rule
requires you to abandon my position, while at the same time requiring
me to sustain it.
Some might use the similar although not identical categories of legal
positivism versus legal realism.
10
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We should note here that there is a curious and tragic
consequence to the recommendation Akavya makes to his son, which
is that he condemns his own halakhic position to extinction. The very
laws for which he staked his life will be lost to future generations since
his son will follow his advice and not adopt his father’s view, and
therefore no one else will either. From this perspective, Akavya’s
recommendation is altogether remarkable.
For one thing, it
demonstrates his ability to live by the distinction between halakhic
truth and halakhic process. He had the capacity to fully integrate the
conviction that if the halakhic process is a good one, then God’s will
has been fulfilled, irrespective of halakhic truth. If his son follows a
healthy halakhic process and conforms to the majority, then God’s will
has been done, even if it runs contrary to Akavya’s own conviction
about what is correct. Now it is one thing to understand this
distinction, but it is altogether different from internalizing and living
by it fully. This is especially true when living by it means the
extinction of the very halakhic positions for which one has sacrificed
so much. How did Akavya manage this almost superhuman feat? I
believe it flows from his experience of God articulated in Pirkei Avot.
All that matters in life is standing before God righteously. Now, if God
wills that the halakhic process follows the majority, and his son
follows the majority, then all is right with God, and Akavya wants no
more out of life than that. He had the capacity to dissociate himself
from his own personal needs completely, and the feelings he might
have had when advising his son because these needs simply didn’t
matter to him. All that did matter was standing righteously before God
in His judgment.
The concluding dialogue in the mishnah further sharpens this
perspective on Akavya. His son finally asks Akavya to commend him
to his colleagues. If the father was banned, no doubt the son, too,
suffered the social consequences of the father’s ostracism. There is,
therefore, considerable pathos to his request for help in easing his way
back into the fellowship of scholars. Akavya responds, in his usual
curt style, that he cannot. His son then asks him why. Is he unworthy
in some way? In his very last words recorded before dying, Akavya
responds: “No [you are not unworthy]. Your own actions will draw
you near or your own actions will distance you.”
At one level, this is the advice of the old Akavya. Letters of
recommendation will do you no good, he tells his son. Your own
knowledge of Torah, your integrity, your commitment to the truth, will
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determine your standing in the community of scholars. In the language
of Pirkei Avot, Akavya meant to say to his son that your standing is
shaped by your commitment to living a life of righteousness before the
judgment of God. Each individual creates his or her own destiny by
the way he or she lives, and by the critical choices made, for there is
no escaping individual responsibility in shaping a life. Akavya meant
to say that this conviction, powerfully articulated in Pirkei Avot,
guided his own life, and must guide his son’s life as well. While his
son must abandon Akavya’s halachot, he must never abandon the
principles that made Akavya the man he was. Those were Akavya’s
very last words.
Yet it is difficult to avoid hearing in these final words another
message as well. For if Akavya taught his son a powerful message
about life, would that very message not apply to his own life as well?
The words “draw you near” and “distance you” are telling indeed, for
Akavya himself was first near the fellowship of scholars, and then
distanced from them, all because of his words and actions. If Akavya
were to apply to himself the advice he gives to his son, then Akavya
here takes responsibility for the critical choices he made in his own
life. Does he regret any of those choices? We have no evidence that
he does, and given the portrait we have drawn of him, it seems unlikely
he would. That said, we do find a softening, a stress, on the importance
of following the majority for his son, and of thereby re-entering the
community of Torah scholars. After all, Akavya had learned from
bitter personal experience just how painful that ostracism can be.
Moreover, we must distinguish between his refusal to retract his
halakhic positions, and the acerbic comments he made about Shemaya
and Avtalyon. While I find it unimaginable that he would regret the
decision to remain loyal to his oral tradition, I do wonder about the
harsh comments he made regarding Shemaya and Avtalyon. For it was
those harsh comments that provoked the painful ban in the first place,
and at the very end of his life, it was that pain he advised his son to
avoid. Of course, we can never really know. All we have are his final
words, which echo long after we read them.
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